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International Copyright: An 
Unorthodox Analysis* 
Hugh C. Hansen 
ABSTRACT 
 Professor Hansen reviews the development of copyright from 
its traditional domestic orientation to the modern emphasis on 
globalization and harmonization.  His commentary analogizes 
modern trends in international copyright to religious equiva-
lents.  He notes that the current players include a “secular priest-
hood” (the traditional copyright bar and academics), “agnostics 
and atheists” (newer academics and lawyers, particularly those 
concerned with technology and the culture of the public domain) 
and “missionaries” (whose task it is to increase copyright protec-
tion around the world and who are primarily driven by trade con-
siderations). The copyright “crusade” has been driven by this last 
group. 
The author compares the task of increasing copyright protec-
tion in newly industrialized and developing countries to the con-
version of any group to a new religion.  The missionaries, primari-
ly from the United States and the European Union, have the choice 
of seeking voluntary or involuntary conversions.  He augurs that 
the prospects for voluntary conversion are slim and that coercion 
 
*  This article was originally printed in the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law.   
Cite as: Hugh C. Hansen, International Copyright: An Unorthodox Analysis, 29 VAND J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 579 (1996). 
 Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I wish to thank 
Sheila J. Levine, Frederick J. Hamble, and Luke Connelly for their assistance on this Ar-
ticle. 
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will continue to be used against newly industrialized and develop-
ing nations when copyright protection is at stake. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Until recently, copyright laws throughout the world were do-
mestically-oriented.  Copyright law is “territorial.” Each nation de-
termines the scope of protection and rights subject only to bilateral 
and multilateral agreements, which, before the Uruguay Round of 
the GATT negotiations and the adoption of the agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) were es-
sentially unenforceable.1 
 Overall there were two systems: (1) the Anglo-American so-
called “economic” system and (2) the French and Continental “au-
thor’s rights” system with its concomitant fascination with “moral 
rights.” Within each system, countries established regimes of pro-
tection that were economically and philosophically compatible 
with their cultures. The broader differences and even the differenc-
es within each system were of mostly academic interest, as there 
was little transnational interaction among those subject to the vari-
ous laws. 
 This situation changed dramatically when copyright industries, 
such as motion pictures, music, and computer software and hard-
ware, began to export their products around the world massively 
and successfully.  The change was given additional impetus by the 
growth of exports in patent industries, such as pharmaceuticals, 
and the accompanying need for trademark protection 
 
 1 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
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abroad.  Intellectual property became very important to the balance 
of trade and jobs.  Government leaders, CEOs, and corporate 
boards in the United States and abroad took notice of the impor-
tance of intellectual property laws. 
 Government initiatives took two forms: a push by the United 
States to include protection for intellectual property in the Uruguay 
Round of GATT negotiations (TRIPS),2 and initiatives in Europe 
to increase patent3 and copyright protection.4  One of the purposes 
of the directives was to improve European competitiveness.5 
 
 2 Id. 
 3 See, e.g., Common Position (EC) 4/94 adopted by the Council on 7 February 1994 
with a view to adopting European Parliament and Council Directive on the legal protec-
tion of biotechnological inventions, 1994 O.J. (C101) 65 [[[hereinafter Biotech Direc-
tive]; Council Regulation 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 on the creation of a supplementary 
protection certificate of medicinal products, 1992 O.J. (L182) 1 [hereinafter Supplemen-
tary Patent Protection Regulation]. 
          The proposed Biotech Directive was originally published in October 1988.  A 
Common Position was reached in February 1994.  After a second reading by Parliament 
and a reconciliation proceeding, it was unexpectedly defeated at the last moment by the 
European Parliament in March 1995.  The process to adopt a biotech directive was started 
again in December 1995, when a new proposal was adopted by the Commission and sent 
to the Council.  The Supplementary Protection Regulation was first proposed by the 
Commission in 1990 and became effective on January 2, 1993. 
 4 See Council Directive 91/250 of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer 
programs, 1991 O.J. (L122) 42 [hereinafter Software Directive]; Common Position (EC) 
No. 20/95 adopted by the Council on 10 July 1995 with a view to adopting Directive 95/ 
/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal protection of databases, 
1995 O.J. (C288) 14, 21. The European Parliament completed its second reading on De-
cember 14th, 1995, with nonsubstantive amendments recommended, A4-0290/95. The 
Commission then passed the proposed database directive as amended on to the Council, 
which adopted it on February 26, 1996. The European Parliament then gave final approv-
al on March 11, 1996. European Parliament and Council Directive 96-9-EC of Mar. 11, 
1996 [hereinafter Database Directive]. 
          These two directives were intended to provide protection for expanded industries 
and, thus, revenue for the EU countries.  See infra notes 5, 13.  The EU has also adopted 
other copyright directives on the rental and lending right, satellite broadcasting and re-
transmission, and term of protection.  The motivation for the adoption of these directives 
had more to do with harmonization and internal market efficiency matters than with in-
ternational copyright or the creation of jobs. 
 5 “[I]t is particularly important to ensure that appropriate legal protection is available 
to computer programs and software generally, which will contribute to an environment 
favourable to investment and innovation by Community firms, thus permitting the Com-
munity industry to catch up with its competitors.” Commission Green Paper on Copyright 
and the Challenge of Technology–Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action, COM 
(88) 172 final, at 175. 
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The nations of the world can be divided broadly into three 
groups based upon their relationship to the production and con-
sumption of intellectual property products: (1) net sellers-
exporters; (2) those with the resources and industries to become net 
sellers-exporters; and (3) net users-importers. The first group, 
whose main member was the United States, wanted broad protec-
tion worldwide. The second group, which included some members 
of the European Community, also wanted broad protection world-
wide and, in addition, wanted to increase protection domestically 
to give more incentives to their industries to create and compete 
domestically and abroad.6  The third group, mainly developing and 
newly industrialized nations, sought to limit protection at least 
within their borders. 
 While those in groups one and two may have had disputes and 
concerns among themselves,7 they were for the most part united on 
the position that they wanted much greater protection in the coun-
tries in group three. Obtaining this protection would require the 
conversion of those who were not true believers in the value of 
copyright or other forms of intellectual property. 
 
          The EC Biotech Directive, supra note 3, was meant to establish a level of protec-
tion that would induce investment in research and development to compete with that in 
the United States and Japan.  See ANNA BOOY & AUDREY HORTON, SWEET & MAXWELL’S 
E.C. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MATERIALS 96 (1994) (“Different levels of patent protec-
tion available in Member states could make the E.C. a less attractive place to invest in 
biotechnological research when compared with the United States and Japan.”); Biotech 
Directive, supra note 3, at recital 3 (“[P]rotection of biotechnological inventions will def-
initely be of fundamental importance for the Community’s industrial development.”). 
Similarly, “the impetus [for the Supplementary Patent Protection Regulation] came from 
the enactment of similar legislation in the United States and Japan, to ensure the competi-
tive position of the E.C.’s pharmaceutical industry….” BOOY & HORTON, supra, at 147. 
 6 See supra notes 4, 5; infra note 13. 
 7 The EU Database Directive and the Duration of Term Directives have reciprocity 
provisions that limit the ability of United States companies and nationals to take advan-
tage of increased protection given to EU companies and nationals. See Database Direc-
tive, supra note 4, art. 11 (sui generis unauthorized-extraction right restricted to EU na-
tionals, companies with habitual residence in the EU, or companies with a registered 
office in a member state with a continuous link with economy of a member state, §§ 1-2; 
nationals of other states may get protection when similar protection is granted in their 
country, §3); Council Directive 93/98 of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of Pro-
tection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 7(2), 1993 O.J. (L290) 9 (The “rule 
of shorter term” provision precludes life-plus-70-year term to works of U.S. companies 
and nationals.). 
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 This commentary attempts to address some of the problems 
that the United States and others faced in bringing about that con-
version.  The first question was who would be on the front line of 
the proselytizing efforts. 
II. THE COPYRIGHT PLAYERS 
 The Secular Priesthood.  Until approximately fifteen to twenty 
years ago, copyright law was the province of a small bar and an 
even smaller cadre of law professors.  The numbers were small be-
cause of the complexity of the law, the limited amount of copyright 
work, and the relatively few schools that taught it on a continuous 
and serious basis. These lawyers and professors practiced and 
wrote about copyright law in the context of traditional copyright 
industries: publishing, theater, motion pictures, music, and art. The 
lawyers related emotionally to the creators. No doubt many at one 
time may have had aspirations to be writers or other types of crea-
tors themselves.  Regardless of what the doctrine stated,8 and with-
out necessarily articulating this view in terms of natural law, they 
nonetheless believed that creators were entitled to copyright in 
their works.9 
 
 8 Copyright doctrine for the most part rejects the view that authors are entitled to pro-
tection from the very fact of creation. Rather, the doctrine states that copyright laws are 
designed to primarily benefit the public by providing incentives to creation. Under this 
view, the benefits authors receive from the copyright laws are a means to an end and not 
the end in itself. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984) (“[M]onopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor 
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a 
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.”); United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“[C]opyright law ... makes reward to the 
owner a secondary consideration.”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) 
(“[S]ole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly 
lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”). 
 9 In John Locke’s view of natural law, a person’s individual effort or labor created an 
individual property interest. Natural law did not require balancing the laborer’s property 
right against anyone else’s needs as long as there was enough raw material left for others: 
The labor of his body and the work of his hands ... are properly his. 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided 
and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it something 
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.... For this labor be-
ing the unquestionable property of the laborer, no [person] but he can 
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 These lawyers and professors, who were primarily based in 
New York (with the later addition of Los Angeles) formed what 
amounted to a secular priesthood protecting the esoteric secrets of 
idea/expression, conceptual separability, and originality.10  Copy-
right work was attractive because it presented the opportunity to 
work in one of the most, if not the most, intellectually challenging 
and interesting areas of the law.11  Copyright also provided the op-
portunity to work with interesting, sometimes very gifted, people 
and with creative and engaging works. 
 International law and international trade were not of interest to 
most of these lawyers or their clients.  To a large extent, they have 
remained outside of the international battles. 
 The Agnostics and Atheists.  Many newcomers to copyright in 
the last ten to fifteen years, especially those in academia, do not 
accept the basic assumptions about creation and ownership long 
shared by the copyright community.  Many do not identify with 
creators but rather with users: Internet (net) users, developing na-
tions, consumers, small competitors, and creators of derivative 
works.  These newcomers to copyright came of age in a time when 
protection was broadly applied to utilitarian works, such as com-
puter programs, and international copyright became trade 
oriented.  They sensed that something was wrong with the current 
system.  Copyright owners were not the Oscar Hammersteins but 
the Time Warners, Sonys, and MCAs.  Whereas the secular priests 
were and are technically challenged, this new breed not only feels 
 
have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is 
enough and as good left in common for others. 
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-
Merrill 1952) (1690). For analyses of John Locke’s natural-law theory in the context of 
intellectual property see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality 
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 
(1993); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990). 
 10 Concerning this analogy, the author refers to priesthoods in ancient Greek and Ro-
man times and not ones as found today. 
 11 In addition to teaching copyright law, this author has taught constitutional law, con-
stitutional criminal law, antitrust, federal courts, EU intellectual property law, and trade-
mark law. The author finds copyright law to be the most intellectually challenging. 
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at home on the net but is creating web sites, home pages, and 
teaching cyberspace law. 
 If this group ever had a high-protection faith in copyright, they 
lost it.  Today they are imbued with the culture of the public do-
main—a “living and vibrant” public domain. This group believes 
that the public domain will protect those on the net, increase com-
petition, allow cultural self-determination, and make multinational 
corporations atone for their sins. This is an unlikely group to enlist 
in the foreign copyright crusades. 
 The Missionaries.  The copyright crusade in large part has 
been driven by trade considerations.  It is not surprising to find 
people with backgrounds in this area (both inside and outside of 
government) at the forefront of the conversion effort.  Joining them 
are lawyers for multinational corporations and trade associations, 
some of whom were in the secular priesthood.  In addition, those 
entrusted with the protection of intellectual property in the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and in the United States government have played 
key roles.  The effort has attracted people with considerable skill 
and ability and, to date, has been remarkably successful. Still, 
much work remains to be done before it can be assured that all 
souls have been saved. 
III. THE RELIGION 
 Wholesale conversion needs the tools of religion, and funda-
mentalist religion at that.  Certain truths are revealed and meant to 
be learned, not debated.  The intellectually complex points of cop-
yright law are for seminary discussion over wine.  Here, high pro-
tection is the key.  The public domain is not a place where you will 
find Robin Hood in Sherwood Forest righting economic 
wrongs.  Rather, the public domain is a place where bandits reple-
nish supplies so they may cross the border to loot and plunder co-
pyrighted works.  For long forays into copyrighted lands, these 
public domain bandits are hidden and fed by consumers who want 
something for nothing and who have an apparently insatiable appe-
tite for unprotected works. 
 As with all fundamentalist religions, this one has fundamental 
truths.  One truth is that computer programs must be protected as 
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literary works.12  The words “sui generis protection” would pro-
duce gasps from the faithful. Another truth is that a high level of 
protection for intellectual property would lead to more investment 
and jobs.13  A third truth is that so called “national treatment” is the 
way to increase protection for all and that “reciprocity” is the na-
tionalistic work of the devil.14 
 The faith in national treatment, which required action as well 
as belief, was harder for the righteous to adhere to fully.  The Unit-
ed States inserted a reciprocity provision in its sui generis legisla-
 
 12 The reasons for protecting computer programs as literary works had much to do with 
the fact that this was the regime in the United States and all countries adhering to the 
Berne Convention already had protection for literary works in place. This tradition of 
protection worked well in the early judicial protection of computer programs. See Whelan 
Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab. Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1031 (1987). But see Computer Assoc. Int’l v. Altai Inc., 928 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). A 
sui generis regime, on the other hand, would require adoption of a new law by every 
country in the world. This would follow endless debate on the multilateral level on what 
and how much to protect. The result would be an uncertain future as to what, if anything, 
would make it into the national laws, without much hope of uniformity. Even a world of 
relatively low protection such as that advanced in Altai would be preferable. 
 13 See supra note 5. The Database Directive is also intended to provide protection for 
expanded industries and, thus, revenue for the EU countries. Recently, a member of the 
European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee, Ana Palacio Vallelersundi (Spain), 
stated that she hoped that “the level of protection afforded by the [directive] and its appli-
cation throughout the [EU] internal market will help to strengthen investment in this key 
sector and to create jobs.” Euro Parliament Approves Legislation on Copyright Protec-
tion of Databases, 10 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 43 (Feb. 1996). 
The Group of Seven ministerial conference, organized by the Euro-
pean Commission last February, concluded that “high levels of legal 
and technical protection of creative content” will be essential to en-
sure the “necessary climate for the investment needed for the devel-
opment of the information society.” 
…. 
The [United States] has always had strong copyright laws, allowing 
producers to enjoy full control over the exploitation of films.  The al-
liance [of European film producers] argues this has been a significant 
factor in the strength of the [United States] in the global entertain-
ment market. 
Robert Rice, Gunning for the Pirates: The Film Industry Faces New Concerns over Cop-
yright, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, at 11. 
 14 “National treatment” is a phrase which means that in country X a work originating 
in a foreign country will be given the same protection as works created in country X. 
“Reciprocity” means that in country X a work of foreign origin will only be given the 
protection to which that work is entitled in its country of origin. 
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tion to protect semiconductor computer chips.15  The EU inserted 
reciprocity provisions in the proposed Database Directive and the 
term directive.16  Even the Berne Convention allows for reciprocity 
in some circumstances.17  However, the slips and falls of our lead-
ers do not mean that religious truths are false, only that the flesh is 
weak. The TRIPS Agreement, recognizing this, requires national 
treatment.18 
IV. THE CONVERSION OF THE UNINITIATED 
 Once you have a religion and missionaries, how do you con-
vert the uninitiated?  There are two broad approaches to conver-
sion: voluntary and involuntary. 
 Voluntary conversion.  Voluntary conversion is obviously the 
ideal.  How does one achieve this?  One way is by exam-
ple.  People see how you live your life and are impressed.  They 
want to have the inner glow that they see in you.  This way is 
somewhat problematic for the United States.  If there is an inner 
glow, it has not been strong enough to be seen from abroad. 
 The United States did not provide protection for foreign works 
for over 100 years.  When the United States finally did begin to 
provide protection, it imposed a requirement that books be manu-
factured in the United States in order to protect the domestic print-
ing industry.  The United States imposed a system of formalities, 
the main purpose of which seemed to be to throw works into the 
public domain, including many famous foreign works.  It just re-
cently joined the Berne Convention, and did so only because other 
nations told it repeatedly, “If you are going to preach the religion, 
you must join the Church.” 
 The U.S. consumer views intellectual property as a hindrance 
to immediate gratification and home-taping as something guaran-
teed by the Bill of Rights.  United States corporations believe the 
French view of moral rights is sentimental slop.  The proposed leg-
 
 15 Semiconductor Chip Act, 17 U.S.C.A. s 901, s 902(a) (1), s 914 (1995). 
 16 See supra note 7. 
 17 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
as last revised July 24, 1971, art. 7(8), 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 18 See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1199. 
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islation in the U.S. Congress for a copyright term of life plus se-
venty years19 stands a chance only in the event money flows from 
Europe to the United States, which is not a copyright concern but a 
balance of trade concern. Thus, conversion by example is a tough 
row to hoe. 
 A second traditional conversion argument focuses on the exis-
tence of an afterlife and one’s place in it.  While the copyright 
faithful might believe that the “free access” or “pro-user” people 
will have some explaining to do, even they will concede that one’s 
chances for salvation are not at stake. 
 A third argument for conversion is to show how the person 
will benefit.  The consuming public, however, benefits in the short 
run from free access to intellectual property much as it does when 
a truck is hijacked and the goods are sold below cost.  Moreover, 
some livelihoods in developing countries may be based upon “pi-
rate” industries. Jobs will be lost, and it may not be apparent or 
obvious how protection of intellectual property will produce new 
jobs in those countries, if in fact it will. It may well be that the glo-
balization of intellectual property is going to produce economic 
winners and losers, with little hope in the short run for the losers to 
change their status. 
 The benefit argument is that the protection of intellectual 
property will produce investment in new or current industries that, 
in the long run, will produce income and jobs.  It has been said that 
“[i]n the long run, we are all dead,”20 and it is usually short-run ar-
guments that the “person in the street” cares about. 
 A fourth argument is that although in the short run it will cost 
money to pay for intellectual property, this cost is as morally ap-
propriate and necessary as paying for food, transportation, and 
consumer goods.  In short, it is simply wrong to take someone 
else’s intellectual property.  While this principle is undoubtedly 
correct, there are obstacles to winning converts on these 
grounds.  First, the consuming public wants goods at lower prices 
and shows little concern for how it gets them.  If a consumer is told 
that the expensive product being sold at a low price was stolen 
 
 19 S. 483, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995); H.R. 989, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995). 
 20 JOHN M. KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY POLICY 88 (1924). 
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from a truck, the consumer’s main concern may be the validity of 
the warranty. 
 Second, even if consumers were concerned with the morality 
of theft, they generally do not treat or value intellectual property in 
the same way that they do tangible property.  For example, if a vi-
deotape of a movie costs forty-nine dollars, only a few dollars of 
that amount represents the costs of manufacturing and delivering 
the tangible property—the cassette.  At least forty dollars, and 
probably more, of the cost is for the intangible property—the mov-
ie.  Everybody thinks it wrong to shoplift the videocassette from a 
store.  On the other hand, almost everybody considers it appropri-
ate to videotape that same forty dollar movie from a television 
set.  Thus, it appears that the inexpensive but tangible videocas-
sette is valued more than the expensive but intangible intellectual 
property.21 
 If the short-run self-interest of the people is an obstacle to 
conversion, the next step is converting the intellectual and power 
elites who may appreciate long-run benefits.  In time, the religion 
can be passed on, imposed on, or trickled-down to the people.  The 
problem is that intellectual and power elites are used to imposing 
 
 21 It is no response to this illustration, as a speaker said at a recent conference at the 
New York University School of Law, that the Supreme Court held that home-taping is 
legal in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). En-
gelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy, The Culture and Economics of Participa-
tion in an International Intellectual Property Regime (March 12, 1996) (unpublished 
Roundtable discussion). 
               First, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision only held that “time-shifting” is a fair 
use; it did not reach the issue of whether “librarying” is a fair use, which is the home-
taping practice analogous to buying or shoplifting a videocassette. Moreover, there were 
not five votes for holding that librarying was a fair use. See Jonathan Band & Andrew J. 
McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A Peek Behind the Scenes at the Making of Sony v. 
Universal, 7 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 427 (1993) (key to Justices Brennan and 
O’Connor’s concurrence was lack of harm in time-shifting). 
               Second, consumers were home-taping long before Sony was decided in the Su-
preme Court and after the Ninth Circuit in Sony had held that home-taping was a viola-
tion of copyright law.  Home-taping, therefore, was not the result of the Supreme Court’s 
decision, however construed by the public. 
               Third, even if the Court had ruled that home-taping for all purposes was a fair 
use, this would only have shown that a majority of the Court shared the same relative 
valuation of tangible and intellectual property as the consuming public.  It would rein-
force the point in the text, not refute it. 
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their views on others, not vice versa.  An idea, whatever its merits, 
may be resisted because of its origin, particularly if it originates 
abroad.  Autonomy, while not appropriate for the masses, becomes 
a mantra for the elites. 
 This is true for developed as well as developing na-
tions.  There are two recent examples.  The first example is in the 
United States. Both the secular priests and agnostics are upset with 
the changes in U.S. law mandated by TRIPS.22  Repeatedly one 
hears concerns that changes in copyright law that derive from in-
ternational obligations do not give due regard to the Copyright and 
Patent Clause in the U.S. Constitution.23  Moreover, there is fear 
that limitations on copyright set forth by the Supreme Court (for 
instance, in Feist24), will not be respected. 
 Whatever the merits of these arguments, disregard of the Con-
stitution or Supreme Court opinions is not a recent phenome-
non.  Despite the fact that Professor Melville Nimmer raised the 
constitutional problems with various aspects of copyright law in 
his original treatise on the 1909 Copyright Act,25 few litigants26 or 
academics have sought to develop those points even after many 
years. Moreover, a number of Supreme Court opinions have been 
ignored or not followed by lower courts.27  Similarly, the Court it-
 
 22 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) 
[hereinafter URAA]. 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8. 
 24 Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 25 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT ch. 1 (1975). It appears from examin-
ing a 1975 version of the treatise that the constitutional problems in copyright law were 
discussed in the treatise at least as of 1972, and may have been discussed as early as 
when it was first published in 1963. Id. 
 26 For instance, no litigant, amicus curiae, or commentator raised, or discussed with 
regard to Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), the issue 
that the work-made-for-hire doctrine, which bypasses the creator and calls the employer 
or hiring party the “author,” is a legal fiction that violates the “author” requirement of 
U.S. CONST. art. I., §8, cl. 8. See NIMMER, supra note 25, § 6.3. 
 27 For example, in broadly worded opinions, the Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 
234 (1964), seemed to preempt much of the law of unfair competition and bar protection 
for three-dimensional trademarks. In Compco the Court stated: 
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made in 
some other way, that the design is “nonfunctional” and not essential 
to the use of either article, that the configuration of the article copied 
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self has sometimes ignored, manipulated, or distorted its own pre-
cedents.28  Even the exalted Feist opinion has been given lip ser-
vice by some lower courts, including one on which retired Justice 
Powell was a member of the panel.29 
 While the recent changes in copyright law raise legitimate 
concerns, the concerns are no greater than those that existed before 
 
may have a “secondary meaning” which identifies the maker to the 
trade, or that there may be “confusion” among purchasers as to which 
article is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant evidence 
in applying a State’s law requiring such precautions as labeling; how-
ever, and regardless of the copier’s motives, neither these facts nor 
any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting 
the actual acts of copying and selling. 
376 U.S. at 238.  Lower courts largely ignored these two cases and, twelve years later, 
the Eighth Circuit held, in effect, that both Supreme Court opinions consisted entirely of 
dicta. See Truck Equip. Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir. 
1976). Of course, the Supreme Court also ignored the above language and the policies 
espoused in Sears and Compco when it held not only that three-dimensional trade dress 
could be protected with secondary meaning but that such trade dress could be protected 
without secondary meaning. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2758 
(1992). While Two Pesos was decided under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a) (1994), there was no indication by the Court that state unfair competition or 
trademark law, which first protected trade dress, could not continue to do so. 
 28 In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954), the Court interpreted (manipulated) the 
“explanation/use” holding of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879), which would 
have prevented the protection for applied art, to merely state that the “protection is given 
only to the expression of the idea -- not the idea itself.” In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994), the Court took the statement in Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984), that if the allegedly infringing 
device “were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use 
would presumptively be unfair,” to stand only for the proposition that commercial use “is 
a factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.” See also the discussion of Sears 
and Compco and Two Pesos, supra note 27. Perhaps the Court applied a better policy in 
the later cases, but it is clear that deference was not given to its earlier pronouncements. 
 29 U.S. Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unltd. of Durham, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q. 2d 2049, 
2050 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (Unpublished opinion not subject to citation in Fourth 
Circuit) (Reference guidebook that provided information for coin-operated telephone 
market including 51-page section on state tariffs infringed when defendants copied this 
section verbatim). The court stated, 
The evidence suggests that the Tariff Section could have been orga-
nized in many different ways and that Payphone expended a great 
deal of time creating the single-page-per-view format. The Guide, ac-
cording to Payphone, is the result of hundreds of hours of reviewing, 
analyzing, and interpreting state tariffs and regulations.  
Id. 
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without much complaint.  What might be particularly upsetting to 
both the secular priests and the agnostics is that these changes have 
been imposed from abroad, with little or no consideration of their 
views.  Copyright is their area, and they are territorial about 
it.  The message to the international set is: Mess around with ta-
riffs, anti-dumping provisions and the like, but leave copyright to 
us. 
 The second example is in the United Kingdom.  In the United 
Kingdom high protection is gospel and there are no known agnos-
tics.  Both television listings and government statutes have been 
protected under copyright law,30 which the secular priests in the 
United States would consider grossly overprotective and in bad 
taste. But even in the land of high protection, increased-protection 
changes can cause resentment if imposed from abroad. Pursuant to 
the EU term directive, Kenneth Grahame’s Wind in the Willows 
had come back into copyright. Alan Bennett had adapted it while it 
was in the public domain and produced an annual Christmas pa-
geant. The new U.K. law allowed derivative works created while 
the work was in the public domain to remain free from new re-
straints. Thus Bennett would not have to seek permission from or 
pay the owner of the rights to Grahame’s works, the Oxford Uni-
versity Library. 
 Oxford, however, had been looking forward to the revenue 
from licensing Bennett’s production.31  One might think that, in a 
high protection country, university students’ sharing with Bennett 
the revenue for a derivative work for which Bennett never paid 
copyright fees would be warmly received. But this is how The 
Times (London) reported the facts: 
Toad of Toad Hall and his friends from the river-
bank have escaped the clutches of the lawmakers in 
Brussels and are able to continue delighting child-
 
 30 See Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, ch. 48, § 164 (U.K.) (copyright 
protection for acts of Parliament); BBC v. Time Out, 1984 F.S.R. 64 (copyright protec-
tion for television listings); Broadcasting Act of 1990, ch. 2, § 176 & sched. 17 (U.K.) 
(compulsory licenses for television listings). 
 31 The Times (London) reported this along with the fact that the Bennett production 
was not subject to copyright restraints. Emma Wilkins, Toad Escapes Clutches of Copy-
right Law, THE TIMES (London), Dec. 26, 1995, at 5. 
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ren of all ages for the rest of the pantomime season 
in London.32 
 Of course, children of all ages would have continued to enjoy 
Toad of Toad Hall even with a licensing requirement.  The slant of 
the story appears to derive from the fact that the law resulted from 
an EU directive.  The bias against such directives appears to over-
shadow the potential benefit to Oxford and the under-financed 
educational system of Britain.33 
 A final problem with any conversion effort is the fact that the 
owners of the intellectual property are, for the most part, from the 
United States.  This seems to upset people throughout the 
world.  Fair-minded Europeans are comfortable with levy laws that 
do not fairly compensate U.S. producers for home-copying34 and 
standardization policies apparently aimed at getting U.S. technolo-
gy at low cost through compulsory licensing.35  Newly industria-
 
 32 Id. 
 33 See John Authers, Paying for Education: Government and Opposition Party Agree 
to Postpone Highly Contentious Issue, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1996, at 8 (“acute crisis” in 
U.K. university funding). 
 34 See, e.g., Law No. 85-660, 1985 J.O. 7495 (July 14, 1985) (Fr.) (U.S. producers and 
performers excluded from claiming on the producers’ and performances’ share by appli-
cation of “first fixation in France requirement” -- claims must be on works or perfor-
mances first fixed in a tangible form and edited in France). 
 35 In 1988, at the urging of the European Commission (the Commission), the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) was created to become the pan-European 
standard-setting body in the telecommunications field. In March 1993, ETSI determined 
that its members should agree, as a condition of membership, to license their intellectual 
property rights for all standards that ETSI approved. Such licensing would be governed 
by the terms of ETSI’s Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy and Undertaking scheme 
(the IPR Undertaking or the Undertaking). Many IP owners viewed the Undertaking as a 
device to require the owners of valuable intellectual property to license at low costs and 
without cross-licensing to those with less valuable intellectual property. Most of those 
who would be required to license were U.S. corporations and most of those who would 
have received were Europeans. ETSI had adopted the IPR Undertaking despite a formal 
communication from the European Commission, which disapproved of involuntary use of 
IP in standard-makings proceedings. Communication from the Commission: Intellectual 
Property Rights and Standardization, COM (92) 445 final (Oct. 27, 1992). 
               In response to ETSI’s adoption of the Undertaking, the Computer and Business 
Equipment Manufacturers Association (CBEMA) filed an antitrust complaint against 
ETSI with the Commission, supported by the Business Software Alliance (BSA) and oth-
ers.  The Commission’s initial review found problems with the ETSI Undertaking and, on 
reconsideration, ETSI scrapped the Undertaking in August 1994 and determined to de-
velop a new IPR policy.  For a full discussion of the ETSI standardization debate and the 
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lized Asian nations that normally place a premium on being law-
abiding are comfortable with their pirate industries that feed on 
U.S. products. The “Ugly American” today is the one who expects 
to be paid. 
 Involuntary Conversion.  The prospects for voluntary conver-
sion are not great.  That leaves conversion by the 
sword.  Apparently recognizing this early on, the United States fa-
vored proceeding through GATT and TRIPS, which had mechan-
isms for sanctions, rather than in the WIPO, which did not.36 
 The WTO, or TRIPS, regime provides mechanisms for both 
the United States and the European Union to enforce provisions 
that increase protection in newly industrialized and developing na-
tions.37  If these mechanisms fail, there is little doubt that bilateral 
trade restraints will be used in these religious wars, whether they 
be “Section 301”38 or ad hoc efforts. When the United States and 
the European Union wanted to achieve increased protection in nar-
row areas of intellectual property between themselves, they each 
used reciprocity provisions, the mortars of religious wars.39  This 
should remove any doubt that coercion will continue to be used 
against newly industrialized and developing nations when broad 
levels of protection are at stake. 
 
policies involved, see Alan N. Dixon, The ETSI Complaint and the European Commis-
sion’s Communication on Standardization, in 1 INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW AND POLICY ch. 39 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., forthcoming 1996). 
 36 This is not to say that the United States considers proceedings in WIPO to be not 
worthwhile. It is actively seeking solutions for the interplay of intellectual property and 
the global information infrastructure through a protocol to the Berne Convention. See 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON A POSSIBLE 
PROTOCOL TO THE BERNE CONVENTION, DRAFT REPORT (1996). 
 37 See TRIPS, supra note 1; J. H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellec-
tual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L 
LAW. 382-88 (1995). 
 38 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2242, 2411 (1994). The willingness of the United States to 
use § 301 is evidenced by the recent amendments under URAA, supra note 22, § 314(c) 
(1), which allow a § 301 proceeding to be brought “notwithstanding the fact that the for-
eign country may be in compliance with the specific obligations of the [TRIPS] Agree-
ment.” See Reichman, supra note 37, at 384. 
 39 See supra note 7. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 Some parties might enjoy theological debates about the 
nuances and complexities of copyright law and the culture of the 
public domain.  For developed nations, however, the trade stakes 
between them and the newly industrialized and developing nations 
with regard to international copyright protection are too high for 
such debates to occur.  That is a luxury left for academics, the re-
fined domestic practice of the secular priests and, possibly, the de-
veloped nations in disputes among themselves. 
 Religious wars can be just as deadly as nonreligious 
ones.  Individuals of good conscience in the past have converted to 
avoid the sword or economic or other sanctions.  Today, the copy-
right wars are still being fought.  The soldiers are in the field and 
the developed nations have won most of the initial battles.  The 
question remains whether the newly industrialized and developing 
nations will ever fully convert.  Lip service can be a valuable de-
fense,40 and political leaders sometimes lose the stomach for war. 
Time will tell. 
 
 
 40 See, e.g., Seth Faison, Copyright Pirates Prosper in China Despite Promises, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1996, at 1. 
